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THE PRIVACY ACTION IN TEXAS: ITS CHARACTERIZATION,
AND A DETERMINATION OF APPLICABLE
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
by Debra Ann Bacharach
Invasion of privacy was not recognized as a cognizable cause of action in
Texas until Billings v. Atkinson.' With this step, Texas joined the main-
stream of American judicial thought on the subject. 2 The privacy action
will become an important one in Texas as hopeful plaintiffs gain encourage-
ment from the fact that two of the four forms of the privacy action, intrusion
and appropriation, have now been recognized, thereby leaving open the
question of whether the other two forms of privacy action, false light and
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, will be recognized in the
future.
As the privacy action is still in its infancy in Texas, a myriad of
unanswered questions remains. For example, what statute of limitation will
apply to the privacy tort? There is no specific statute of limitation with
respect to privacy actions in Texas and as yet there has not been a judicial
resolution of this issue. The question is dependent on an interpretation of
the various existing statutes of limitations and the characterization of the
privacy tort as recognized in Texas. Further, the question of whether it is
even appropriate for the newly recognized privacy tort to fit under one of the
present limitation statutes, which were designed to accommodate forms of
action recognized at common law, must be considered and answered. It is
the purpose of this Comment to explore the nature of the privacy tort as it
has been judicially defined; to analyze the nature of the tort as recognized in
Texas; and to determine the applicable statute of limitation to the privacy
action in Texas by a consideration of both the characterization of the tort
and the general purposes, policies, and construction of the statutes of
limitations in Texas. After determining the applicability of present Texas
statutes of limitations to the several types of privacy actions expressly or
implicitly recognized by Texas courts so far, this Comment submits a
proposal for a new statute of limitation to accommodate the very recently
recognized privacy right in Texas.
I. THE PRIVACY TORT
A. Characterization of the Privacy Action
It was not until the publication of a famous law review article by Warren
and Brandeis in 18903 that invasion of privacy was introduced and defined
1. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
2. Only three states expressly reject the privacy action as of this writing: Rhode
Island, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust & Sav.,
356 F. Supp. 811 (D. Neb. 1973); Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I.
1972); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
3. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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as an independent legal cause of action. 4  Although courts had long
recognized and given effect to rights that were essentially the same as the
right of privacy under the guise of property rights, or breach of confidence or
an implied contract,5 this article had a dramatic impact on the legal
fraternity and led to the recognition in many states of a new cause of action.6
Conceived by Warren and Brandeis as part of the broad right of an
individual to "an inviolate personality,"' 7 the right of privacy has become a
composite of diverse interests and has been held to apply to many different
kinds of situations.8 Characterization of the privacy cause of action thus
becomes most complex. As suggested by Prosser,9 and as indicated by case
law,'0 invasion of privacy is not one tort, but a complex of four torts tied
together by a common name, but otherwise having almost nothing in
common. These four torts have been categorized as follows: (1) intrusion
upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3)
publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4)
appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness." These four types of invasion may be subject, in some respects at
least, to different rules, and confusion may result from mixing the different
types. 12
The first variation of the privacy action, intrusion upon the plaintiff's
solitude or seclusion, "is an intentional tort analogous to trespass and battery
4. The significance of the recognition of the right of privacy as an independent
cause of action was noted by the court in Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 17 Ill. App.
2d 205, 149 N.E.2d 761 (1958), as follows: "Basically, recognition of the right of
privacy means that the law will take cognizance of an injury, even though no right of
property or contract may be involved and even though the damages resulting are
exclusively those of mental anguish." Id. at 206, 149 N.E.2d at 762, quoting Eick v.
Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 299, 106 N.E.2d 742, 745 (1952).
5. The interests protected by the privacy concept are varied, and in addition to the
personal interest of the individual "to be let alone," there have been at least three other
separate interests, somewhat analogous to property rights, protected: interest in one's
history, interest in one's likeness, and interest in one's name. See Feinberg, Recent
Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 713, 717 (1948).
6. The right of privacy has been judicially defined as: '. . . mhe right of
an individual to be let alone, or to live a life of seclusion, or to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without interference by the public
about matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned, or to
be protected from any wrongful intrusion into an individual's private life
which would outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to
a person of ordinary sensibilities.'
Earp v. City of Detroit, 16 Mich. App. 271, 167 N.W.2d 841, 845 (1969). In addition,
the right of privacy has been recognized and stated by the American Law Institute as
follows: "The right of privacy is invaded when there is (a) intrusion upon the seclusion
of another . . . or (b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness . . . or (c) publicity
given to the other's private life . . . or (d) publicity which places the other in a false
light before the public ....... RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (Tent.
Draft No. 21, 1975).
7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 205.
8. See, e.g., notes 13-30 infra and accompanying text.
9. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 802-18
(4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rnv. 383 (1960).
10. Prosser's conclusions come from his synthesis of over three hundred cases on
privacy from all over the nation. Prosser, supra note 9, at 388-89.
11. Id. at 389.
12. Id.
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in protection of personal integrity." 13 It includes not only physical inva-
sion,14 but also eavesdropping upon private conversations by wiretapping or
microphones 15 and spying into windows of a home. 16 To constitute a valid
cause of action, defendant's conduct must outrage one of ordinary sensibili-
ties; the hypersensitive person may not recover for actions which are merely
rude or inconsiderate.' 7 The interest protected is primarily a mental one
rather than economic or pecuniary.' 8 The "public figure" defense is not
relevant in this type of invasion of privacy, since no publication is in-
volved;' 9 however, it is necessary that the thing intruded upon or pried into
is, and must be entitled to be, private.20
The second variation of the privacy tort, public disclosure of private facts,
is altogether distinct from intrusion. The public disclosure tort involves
publication of matter which would be offensive and objectionable to a
reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. 2' Authorities have disagreed on
what interest is protected by this tort. According to Prosser, the interest
protected by the public disclosure action is that of reputation, with the same
13. McCormick v. Haley, 37 Ohio App. 2d 73, 307 N.E.2d 34, 38 (1973), quoting
LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1963).
14. See, e.g., Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (entry
without legal authority to arrest husband); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d
816 (1952) (landlord moving in on tenant); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716
(W. Va. 1959) (illegal search of shopping bag in store).
15. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810
(1939) (defendant caused receiving set to be installed in plaintiff's room); Roach v.
Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958) (listening device installed by landlord in tenant's
apartment).
16. Pritchett v. Board of Comm'rs, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32 (1908) (owner of a
residence near adjoining jail may have relief from the nuisance of invasion of his privacy
by the jail windows being left open so that the prisoners may look into the house);
Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 1956) (cause of action that
insurer and detective agency violated the "Peeping Tom" statute by trespassing on
claimant's property and peeping into windows); Moore v. New York El. R.R., 130 N.Y.
523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892) (loss of privacy occasioned by the ability of the defendant's
passengers and employees to look into plaintiff's upper-story windows from the platform
and stairs of defendant railroad station may be considered in action to recover damages
to easements).
17. Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 332 (D.S.C. 1966). In Shorter
the court said that when a plaintiff bases an action for invasion of privacy on intrusion
alone, bringing forth no evidence of publication on the part of the defendant, it is
incumbent upon him to show a blatant and shocking disregard of his rights by the
defendant, and serious mental or physical injury or humiliation to himself resulting
therefrom.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 301, 292 N.Y.S.2d 514,
517 (Sup. Ct. 1968). Applying District of Columbia law, the New York Supreme Court
held here that the plaintiff, a well-known public figure, had a constitutional right to
maintain an action for invasion of privacy based on the defendant's unprivileged
wiretapping, making of harassing telephone calls, trailing by private detectives, and other
conduct.
20. LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533, 536
(1963).
21. Prosser, supra note 9, at 396. The decision which has become the leading case
is Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931), which involved a motion picture
that revealed the present identity of a reformed prostitute who had been the defendant in
a murder trial seven years before and who had since become a respectable member of
society living in obscurity. Most states are very skeptical of the public disclosure tort.
See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), where recovery
was denied to a young man who years before had been an infant prodigy well-known to
the public. An article published by a magazine had depicted intimate details of the
man's secluded and theretofore obscure personal adult life.
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overtones of mental distress that are present in libel and slander. 22  More-
over, he characterizes this tort as essentially an extension of defamation into
the field of publications that do not fall within the narrow limits of the old
torts, with the elimination of the defense of truth.23  On the other hand,
Warren and Brandeis, who seemed especially concerned with this form of the
privacy tort, said that the injury inflicted by the invasion of privacy bears
only a superficial resemblance to the wrongs dealt with by defamation, owing
to the nature of the instruments by which the invasion occurs. 24  They
explained that whereas the legal remedy for privacy involves the treatment
of wounded feelings, the defamation principle, dealing only with damage to
reputation with the injury done to the individual in his external relations to
the community, covers a radically different interest. 25
The third variation of the privacy action, publicity which places plaintiff
in a false light in the public eye, requires some element of untruth, and thus
differs from the tort of public disclosure which functions irrespective of the
truth.26  According to Prosser, the interest protected by the "false light" tort
is clearly that of reputation, with overtones of mental distress.2 7  Other
authorities have characterized the injury primarily as one of injury to the
person through mental anguish, embarrassment, or humiliation. 28  Although
the portrayal need not necessarily be defamatory, there has been a good deal
of overlapping of defamation and false light cases, and it seems clear that
either action, or both, will very often lie. 29
22. Prosser, supra note 9, at 398.
23. Id.
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 197.
25. Id.
26. Examples of the false light type of privacy action are cases falsely attributing to
the plaintiff some opinion or utterance, the unauthorized use of plaintiff's name to
advertise for witnesses of an accident, the use of plaintiff's picture to illustrate a book or
article with which he has no reasonable connection, and the inclusion of the plaintiff's
name, photograph, and fingerprints in a public "rogues' gallery" of convicted criminals,
when he has not in fact been convicted of any crime. See, e.g., Leverton v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (article concerning the negligence of
children); Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948) (face of an
innocent person used in conjunction with an article depicting taxicab drivers as ill-
mannered and dishonest); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630
(1952) (magazine article on love between the opposite sexes and its relation to divorce);
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905) (placing of plaintiff's picture in
rogues' gallery); Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So. 2d 61 (La. Ct. App.
1955) (unauthorized use of insured's name in advertisement); Thompson v. Close-Up,
Inc., 277 App. Div. 848, 98 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1950) (article concerning the peddling of
narcotics); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (plaintiff's
name signed to a telegram to the governor urging political action which would have been
illegal for him, as a state employee, to advocate).
27. Prosser, supra note 9, at 400.
28. Other authorities, however, have disagreed with Prosser's analysis. See, e.g.,
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 981 (1964); Nimmer, The Right To Speak From Times to Time:
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
935, 958 (1968); note 104 infra and accompanying text.
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 813; Linehan v. Linehan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 250,
285 P.2d 326 (1955) (defendant's statements that plaintiff was living with her husband
sinfully and illegally, held sufficient to sustain the finding that the defendant was guilty
of slander and invasion of privacy); Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183
N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (complaint alleging that a purchaser of a photograph from a
client for whom a model had originally posed had altered the photograph and added
suggestive captions injuring the model's reputation as an individual and in the trade, held
19751
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The fourth variation of the privacy action, appropriation of plaintiff's
likeness or name, concerns the exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff's
identity to the advantage of the defendant. Examples of this action are
where the plaintiff's name or picture has been used without his consent to
advertise the defendant's product, to accompany an article sold, or for other
business purposes.30 This form of the privacy tort is clearly distinct from
the other three. The interest protected by the appropriation theory is not so
much a mental as a proprietary one: plaintiff's interest is his name and
likeness as an aspect of his identity.31 A decision of the Second Circuit
3 2
has recognized the proprietary nature of the action, concluding that an
exclusive license has a "right of publicity" which entitles the owner to enjoin
the use of his name or likeness by a third person. 3 In jurisdictions where
the privacy -tort has not been recognized, similar results in appropriation
cases have been possible under a breach of trust or quasi-contract theory.
3 4
B. Break with Precedent: Recognition of the Privacy Right in Texas
Prior to the 1973 case of Billings v. Atkinson3  Texas courts consistently
sufficient to state a cause of action for libel and invasion of privacy); Martin v. Johnson
Publishing Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (defendant's publishing of plaintiff's
photograph without consent in conjunction with a lurid story, held libelous and invasion
of plaintiff's right to privacy); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959)
(irate assistant manager's acts of blocking a departed customer's path and searching her
pockets and purse, held slanderous and an invasion of the customer's privacy). In Kerby
v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577, 581 (1942), the court
recognized that the letter complained of might very well have formed the basis of a libel
charge. See also Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953)
(the applicable statute of limitation for defamation was bypassed by amending the action
as one for the invasion of privacy).
30. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291 P.2d 194
(1955) (defendant advertised erroneously and without the plaintiff's consent that the
plaintiff was a satisfied user of the defendant's machine); McCreery v. Miller's Grocer-
teria, 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1936) (plaintiff, who had employed a photographer to
take and finish four pictures, later discovered the photographer had exposed a copy to
public view in his showcase); Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17
P.2d 535 (1932) (an undertaker caused pictures of a dead body being moved from an
airplane to be inserted in newspapers for advertising purposes); Korn v. Rennison, 21
Conn. Supp. 400, 156 A.2d 476 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1959) (defendant allegedly used the
plaintiff's photograph, without the plaintiff's consent, for advertising purposes); Fisher v.
Murray M. Rosenberg, Inc., 175 Misc. 370, 23 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (a
photograph of a member of a professional dancing team was used without his consent in
advertising shoes).
31. Prosser, supra note 9, at 406.
32. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), rev'g sub nom. Bowman Gum, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). The court thus explained the
right of publicity, or the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing one's picture:
"For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances .... ." 202 F.2d at 868.
33. Not all courts, however, have agreed. See, e.g., Strickler v. National Broadcast-
ing Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958). In this action for invasion of privacy by way
of a network telecast of a dramatized version of the plaintiff's experiences in connection
with an emergency landing of a commercial airliner, the court refused to recognize the
right of publicity as a new property right in California. Id. at 70. See generally
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 203 (1954); Note, The
Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 YALE L.J. 1123 (1953).
34. Cf. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315
U.S. 823 (1942).
35. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
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refused to consider invasion of privacy as an actionable legal claim. O'Brien
v. Pabst Sales Co.3 1 concerned a famous former football player who brought
an action for invasion of his right of privacy and for damages by way of
injury to him in using his name and picture in advertising beer. The
plaintiff failed in his attempt because the Fifth Circuit ruled that he was not
a private person and because he was constantly seeking publicity.8 7 It was
recognized by Circuit Judge Holmes in his dissenting opinion,38 however,
that under the Texas common law, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover
the reasonable value of the use in trade and commerce of his picture for
advertisement purposes, to the extent that such use was appropriated by
defendant. The right to use one's name or picture for purposes of commer-
cial advertisement, he said, "is a property right that belongs to every one; it
may have much or little, or only a nominal, value; but it is a personal right,
which may not be violated with impunity."39
In U.S. Life Insurance Co. v. Hamilton,40 where the plaintiff sought to
recover for the unauthorized use of his signature and name in the promotion
of the defendant's business, recovery of nominal damages was allowed. 4'
However, the court did not find it necessary to decide whether the right of
privacy should be recognized as a cause of action in Texas, for it held that
damages in such a case are not based upon or restricted to an invasion of the
plaintiff's privacy as that legal concept has been developed by judicial
decisions in other jurisdictions. Instead, the court held that the use of an
individual's signature for business purposes unquestionably constitutes the
exercise of a valuable right of property in the broadest sense of the term;
thus, the court based the plaintiff's complaint and nominal recovery upon an
infringement of property rights in and to the exclusive use of his signature,
irrespective of the question of privacy as an independent ground of recov-
ery.4 2
As recently as 1952 the Texas court of civil appeals, in Milner v. Red
River Valley Publishing Co.,43 refused to recognize the right of privacy,
relying on the proposition that Texas common law, as a fixed body of law,
can only be changed by legislative enactment. The court reasoned that, as
"Texas courts are limited to -the enforcement of rights under the common law
as it existed on January 20, 1840," unless changed, modified, added to, or
repealed by statute, and as the right of privacy was not recognized under the
common law at that time, no recovery could be had in Texas for invasion of
privacy as such.44 Prior to Billings, other Texas courts and federal courts
applying Texas law had followed the Milner decision and had continued to
deny that invasion of privacy was a cognizable claim in that state.45
36. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942).
37. Id. at 170.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 238 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 292.
42. Id.
43. 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ).
44. Id. at 229.
45. McCullagh v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 4, 5 (5th Cir.), cert.
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Billings v. Atkinson46 concerned an action against the telephone company
and its employee for damages arising out of the installation of a wiretap
device on the plaintiff's telephone. The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that
although the law of Texas had not recognized a cause of action for a breach
of the privacy right, as such, the court in Milner did recognize that some of
the right of privacy interests have been protected under such traditional
theories as libel and slander, wrongful search and seizure, eavesdropping,
and wiretapping. 47 Moreover, "eavesdropping was an indictable offense at
common law."' 48  Measured by these considerations, the court recognized
invasion of the right of privacy as a legal cause of action, portraying illegal
wiretapping as a classic example of the tort of intrusion upon the plaintiff's
seclusion or solitude, and awarded to plaintiff actual damages of $10,000
plus $15,000 exemplary damages. Speaking through Justice Denton, the
court stated that the right of privacy is "the right to be free from the
unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publiciz-
ing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern,
or the wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such manner as to
outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities."' 49  Although the court seemed to recognize all four
forms of the tort in this definition, because of Justice Denton's careful
analogizing of the Billings wiretapping to eavesdropping, a common law
offense, it is likely that only the tort of intrusion was actually recognized.
A plaintiff was not again successful in a privacy action in Texas until
1975 in the case of Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA.50  Kimbrough con-
cerned a former college football player who filed suit to recover damages for
the unauthorized exploitation of his name and likeness for commercial
purposes. The Texas court of civil appeals held that the plaintiff had a
denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (prior Texas court decisions had foreclosed any cause of
action based on the invasion of privacy); Hansson v. Harris, 252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where the plaintiff had been arrested for a
misdemeanor, photographed, and fingerprinted, and the arresting officers had acted in
good faith but no complaint had been filed against the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not
entitled to an injunction on the ground that the police chief had invaded the plaintiff's
right of privacy by transmitting the plaintiff's photograph and fingerprints to other law
enforcement officials and exhibiting them in the rogues' gallery not open to the general
public). In a post-Milner decision, Payne v. Laughlin, 486 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1972, no writ), relief for invasion of privacy was also denied in the
absence of the pleading of trespass, wiretapping, or property damage in an action based
on the defendant's allegedly keeping the plaintiff under surveillance.
46. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973). See also Note, Billings v. Atkinson: Texas
Recognizes Invasion of the Right of Privacy as an Actionable Tort, 27 Sw. L.J. 865
(1973).
47. 489 S.W.2d at 860.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 859.
50. 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For cases
where the general right of privacy in Texas was recognized but where the plaintiff's
claim was rejected, see Tosh v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir.
1973) (action of the police department in making a limited release of arrest information
could not be characterized as an invasion of the union organizers' right to privacy);
Cullum v. Government Employees Fin. Corp., 517 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (a creditor's writing of one letter to a debtor's
employer seeking assistance in collecting a debt did not give the debtor a cause of action
for invasion of the right to privacy).
[Vol. 29
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cognizable cause of action for violation of his right of privacy, and that the
evidence raised the issue as to whether the plaintiff, who had agreed to allow
his picture and name to be used in connection with a project honoring
outstanding college football players in the area and institutional advertise-
ments promoting college football, consented to the use of his name and
likeness in a beverage advertisement, thereby precluding summary judgment.
The defendants in this case argued that the plaintiff, being a "public person,"
had no cause of action for violation of any proprietary right or right of
privacy and cited O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co.51 in support of their position.
The court in Kimbrough, however, distinguished O'Brien from the case at
bar. In O'Brien, the plaintiff, a highly publicized figure, failed to recover on
his claim that his name and picture had been used with a beer advertise-
ment. The court in Kimbrough observed that whereas the claim in O'Brien
was not for the value of the plaintiff's name in advertising a product but for
damages by way of injury to plaintiff by using his name in advertising beer,
in Kimbrough the claim was to recover damages for the unauthorized
appropriation and use of plaintiff's name and likeness in an advertising
program.52
In summary, only two types of privacy have thus far been explicitly
recognized in Texas, intrusion and appropriation. While the courts have
indicated their willingness to reverse precedent and recognize the right, only
the tip of the iceberg has been explored, and whether or not Texas courts
will recognize the more controversial privacy torts of public disclosure and
false light are questions that remain to be answered. Should the right be
extended in Texas to cover these additional two privacy actions, the addi-
tional question arises concerning the applicable statutes of limitations.
C. Characterization and Analysis of the Privacy Tort in Texas
Rather than distinguishing Kimbrough from O'Brien in terms of the type
of damages sought by the plaintiffs, the Texas court of civil appeals in
Kimbrough Could have gotten around the so-called "public figure" defense
by simply holding that such a defense, although applicable to defamation
cases, does not apply to the appropriation type of invasion of privacy. The
Alabama Supreme Court has said, for example, that even the most famous
have a right to be protected against the unauthorized commerical appropria-
tion of their names and photographs, and that although a public figure may
be the proper subject of news, the privilege does not extend to commerciali-
zation of his personality in a manner altogether distinct from the dissemina-
tion of news or information. 53
51. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942).
52. 521 S.W.2d at 721.
53. Bell v. Birmingham Broadcasting Co., 266 Ala. 266, 96 So. 2d 263, 265-66
(1957). See also Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788,
340 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct. 1973) ("There is no question but that a celebrity has a
legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality. He must be considered as
having invested years of practice and competition in a public personality which eventual-




,Because of the court's careful distinction in Kimbrough between the type
of damages sought in O'Brien and in Kimbrough, and the court's recognition
of the proper element of damages in an appropriation case of the value of the
plaintiff's name in advertising a product instead of injury to him in the way
of mental anguish, the appropriation type of privacy action in Texas appears
identical to the quasi-contract action. This does not seem to be the case in
many jurisdictions other than Texas which recognize as the major element of
damages in an appropriation action personal damages such as mental
anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation. 54
A quasi-contractual obligation has been recognized by the Texas courts to
be one that is created by the law for reasons of justice, without any
expression of assent, and sometimes even against a clear ex pression of
dissent.5 5 Contracts implied in law, or quasi-contracts, rest solely on a legal
fiction and are not contract obligations in the true sense, for there is no
actual assent as in the case of true contracts. 56  Such implied-in-law
obligations rest on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed
to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. Therefore, "when the
party to be bound is under a legal obligation to perform the duty from which
his promise is inferred, the law may infer a promise even as against his
intention. '57  Generally restitutional in nature, the amount of recovery
would be the unjust enrichment of the defendant by his appropriation of the
plaintiff's property. It is submitted that this quasi-contractual cause of
action for such pecuniary damages is in essence what is being recognized by
the Texas courts under the rubric of the appropriation type of privacy action.
-In summary, the characterization of the two types of privacy action as
recognized in Texas thus far, intrusion and appropriation, are in essence very
different. While the interest protected by the tort of intrusion is that of
personal feelings such as mental anguish, embarrassment, and humiliation,
the interest protected by the appropriation tort is essentially a pecuniary one
measured by the value of the defendant's unjust enrichment.
54. See, e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 291
P.2d 194 (1955) (an attorney whose name, personality, and endorsement had been
appropriated in an advertisement was compensated only for injury to his peace of mind
and to his feelings); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d
577 (1942) (the court spoke only of the traditional compensation for injury to feelings
where an actress's name was appropriated in an advertisement which cast doubt on her
moral character).
55. Richardson v. Permacel Tape Corp., 244 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1957); Leonard v.
State, 56 Tex. Crim. 307, 315, 120 S.W. 183, 187 (1909); Ferrous Prod. Co. v. Gulf
States Trading Co., 323 S.W.2d 292, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959), aff'd, 160
Tex. 399, 332 S.W.2d 310 (1960); Miekow v. Faykus, 297 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Colbert, 127
S.W.2d 1004, 1008 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1939), rev'd, 136 Tex. 268, 150 S.W.2d
771 (1941); Farmers' State Bank & Trust Co. v. Gorman Home Ref., 273 S.W. 694, 696(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1925), afI'd, 3 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmts of
the district court and court of civil appeals aff'd). See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CoNTRAcTs 27-30 (one vol. ed. 1952); Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE
L.J. 533, 533-34 (1912).





D. Allowing the Plaintiff To Choose the Characterization of the Wrong in
an Appropriation Case: Waiver of the Tort
According to common law, a tortiously injured plaintiff is often allowed to
waive the tort and sue in quasi-contract.58 If the Texas judiciary should
choose in the future to expand the appropriation type of privacy action to
encompass injury to the feelings and humiliation damages, as recognized in
other jurisdictions, the plaintiff in such a case should theoretically be entitled
to sue on the tort or, if he wishes, to waive the tort and sue in quasi-contract
for the unjust enrichment of the defendant for unauthorizedly appropriating
to his benefit the plaintiff's property. This latter choice should be especially
suited to the public figure who, being continuously in the limelight by way of
circumstance or his achievements, could not justifiably complain of mental
anguish at having been cast in the public gaze; indeed, such public figure
may well benefit by added exposure to the public.
Because the privacy action is essentially a hybrid, courts generally have
encountered difficulties in characterizing the nature of the wrong inflicted.
Certain courts have treated the privacy action as a property right, and others
have characterized it as a personal right. Texas has chosen to treat an
action for intrusion as protecting a personal right and an action for appropri-
ation as protecting an economic right. Whether or not Texas' characteriza-
tion of the appropriation tort will be broadened to encompass personal injury
remains an unresolved question. Perhaps the doctrine of waiver of the tort
would eliminate much of the difficulty of deciding the nature of the action by
letting the plaintiff choose his own characterization of the injury inflicted. It
must be realized, however, that this would also permit the plaintiff to choose
his own statute of limitation.
Courts in some jurisdictions have not permitted the plaintiff to choose his
own characterization of the privacy action by waiving the tort action for
violation of the right of privacy and bringing suit in assumpsit.5 9 This
58. For example, if the defendant converts the plaintiff's property to his own use
and sells it for a certain amount, the plaintiff may sue in various tort actions; but he may
sue also, if he desires to do so, in assumpsit for the proceeds received by the defendant
from the sale. The defendant is under an obligation to turn over these proceeds, and this
obligation is said to be quasi-contractual in nature. Corbin, supra note 55, at 535-36. It
must be realized, however, that in order for the doctrine of waiver of tort to apply, the
defendant must have been unjustly enriched, and it is not sufficient merely that the
plaintiff has been impoverished by the tort. If the plaintiff's claim is in reality to
recover damages for an injury done, his sole remedy is to sue in tort. W. KEENER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 160 (1893).
59. See, e.g., York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field, 4
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 499 (1957). See also Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243,
254 (1944) (inconsistent for the plaintiff to sue the defendant for $100,000 for
publishing a short biographical sketch, as constituting an invasion of the right of privacy,
and in the same suit claim $100,000 on the theory that the plaintiff was entitled to a
share in the proceeds of the sale of the book); Hart v. E.P. Dutton & Co., 197 Misc. 274,
93 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874-77 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 935, 98 N.Y.S.2d 773
(1950) (the complaint stated a cause of action for libel which was barred by the one-
year statute of limitations and the plaintiff could not waive the tort and sue in assumpsit
so as to make the longer limitation period relating to contracts applicable). Contra,
Young v. That Was the Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (recovery
upon a theory of unjust enrichment is normally permitted only where there has been
some deliberate association of the plaintiff's name or likeness with a defendant's product
in connection with an advertising or promotional scheme).
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refusal, however, generally has not been based upon very convincing ration-
ales. Two reasons for this reluctance in extending the restitutional remedy
to the privacy action are that rights in the personality have not typically been
the subject of bargain transactions in the past and that torts which most
typically result in enrichment of the wrongdoer have to do with infringement
of property interests rather than interests in the personality.60 These two
arguments, however, have become increasingly insignificant with the growth
of new forms of technology and the concomitant expansion of the broadcast-
ing media and the advertising industry. The use of the names of well-known
individuals in the advertisement of products for sale to the public has come
to pervade newspaper, magazine, and television advertising.61 Commenting
on appropriation, the Restatement (Second) of Torts6 2 states that although
protection of the plaintiff's feelings against mental distress is an important
factor leading to recognition of the appropriation tort, "the right created by it
is in the nature of a property right, for the exercise of which an exclusive
license may be given to a third person, which will entitle such a licensee to
maintain an action to protect it.'' 63 Thus, according to the interpretation
given by the Restatement to the action for unauthorized appropriation of the
name or likeness of another to the defendant's benefit, the rule is limited in
application to those instances where one can give an exclusive license to
another, thereby permitting by way of definition an action for unjust
enrichment. 64
Although the appropriation action in Texas is presently characterized as a
quasi-contractual action, the question remains open whether -the Texas courts
will eventually extend this type of action to encompass personal injuries such
as mental anguish. The extension of the scope of appropriation to include
such personal damages would seem to serve better the needs of the average
citizen, whose name or likeness might have only a small pecuniary value, but
whose mental anguish at such unwarranted public exposure might be
extremely great. If the Texas courts decide to broaden the appropriation
action, it is submitted that rather than trying to characterize the nature of
appropriation and the interest protected, the doctrine of waiver of the tort
could be utilized to allow the plaintiff to choose his own characterization of
the interest invaded by the defendant's conduct. In this way, both the
average citizen and the famous figure would be amply protected by allowing
60. Gordon, Recoveries for Violation of the Right of Privacy in Quasi-Contract and
the Federal Income Tax: An Illustration of Law's Response to Changes in Attitudes
About the Personality, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 368, 371 (1964).
61. Indeed, even as early as 1907 it was recognized by the New Jersey court of
chancery that "[ilf a man's name be his own property, as no less an authority than the
United States Supreme Court says it is, . . . it is difficult to understand why the peculiar
cast of one's features is not also one's property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has
one, does not belong to its owner, rather than to the person seeking to make an
unauthorized use of it." Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A.
392, 394 (Ch. 1907). In Edison the court held that an injunction would lie to restrain
the unauthorized use of one's name by another as a part of its corporate title, or in
connection with its business or advertisements.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 652C, comment a at
108 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. See Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899, 918-19 (1971).
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either type of action to be brought. The characterization chosen of the type
of injury inflicted would then determine the statute of limitation to be
applied.
II. APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
TO PRIVACY
A. Purpose, Policy, and Construction of Statutes of Limitations
The primary purpose of statutes of limitations is to compel the assertion of
claims within a reasonable period after their origin, so that the opposing
party has a fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available and the
evidence is still fresh in their minds.65  Statutes of limitations are now
regarded with favor as based upon considerations of sound public policy and
are eminently conducive to social order.66  They are in the nature of
statutes of repose, requiring diligence in enforcing rights and putting an end
to litigation. 67 The Texas Supreme Court, as early as 1847, recognized that
statutes of limitations proceed upon the presumption that claims are extin-
guished, or ought to be held so, whenever they are not litigated in the proper
forum within the prescribed period.68 The concept behind statutes of limita-
tions is that of laches or the negligence of the party in bringing an action
late; therefore, statutes of limitations take away all solid ground of complaint
and serve to quicken diligence by making it in some measure equivalent to
right.6
The particular period selected as the limitation for bringing suit in ordinary
private civil litigation often varies with the degree of permanence of the
evidence required to prove either liability or extent of damage. For
example, statutes of limitations for contract actions are typically longer than
those for ordinary tort claims. In addition, sometimes the period enacted by
the legislature as the statute of limitations for a particular action indicates the
relative favor or disfavor with which the legislature looks upon certain types
of claims or certain classes of plaintiffs or defendants.70 Public policy often
favors a quick settlement of a particular type of suit, both in order to dispose
of frivolous claims and because of the special type of injury to be compensat-
ed, such as humiliation damages difficult of ascertainment or reputation
damages which by their very nature are transitory and subject to the respect
an individual holds in society at a particular, limited time. For example, in
Texas, actions of libel and slander, breach of promise to marry, and
seduction are subject to the short limitation period of one year. 71
65. Lynch v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Tex. 1951);
Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1975); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d
577 (Tex. 1967).
66. Davis v. Howe, 213 S.W. 609, 611 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted);
Callan v. Bartlett Elec. Coop., 423 S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Hackworth v. Ralston Purina Co., 214 Tenn. 506, 381 S.W.2d 292, 293-94
(1964); Davis v. Howe, 213 S.W. 609, 611 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).
68. Gautier v. Franklin, 1 Tex. 732, 739 (1847).
69. id.
70. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1178,
1185-86 (1950).
71. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5524 (1958).
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In an early Texas case the state supreme court stated that where no
provision of the statutes of limitations is directly applicable to a cause of
action sought to be litigated, the limitation in analogous cases will be applied;
and that if the matters in controversy be not analogous to any embraced in
the statute, then the longest period would be the rule.72  However, more
recent cases have held that statutes of limitations must be strictly con-
strued, 73 that such statutes are to be construed as other statutes, and that
their application is not to be evaded by implied exceptions.74  Texas courts
recognize the general principle for the construction of statutes of limitations
today to be that unless some ground can be found in the statute for
restraining or enlarging the meaning of its general words, they must receive a
general construction. 75 Furthermore, the courts cannot arbitrarily subtract
from or add to the statute of limitation and cannot create an exception where
none exists, even when the exception would be an equitable one. The
statute of limitation is considered as intending to embrace all causes of action
not specifically excepted from its operation, and should not be so construed
as to defeat that object.7"
The original statute of limitation, 7 enacted in England in 1623, was fitted
to the formal requirements of common law pleading and applied the
limitation upon the form in which the action was brought. 78  Except for
slight variations in time periods, this statute was generally adopted in its
entirety by the early state legislatures.7 9 With the abolition in most states of
the forms of action, it was generally held that the object and actual nature
of the action, rather than the mere name or form, should control in determin-
ing the limitation period.8 0 For example, it is generally held that where a
statute limits the time in which an action for "injuries to the person" may be
brought, the statute is applicable to all actions the real purpose of which is to
recover for an injury to the person, whether based upon contract or tort, in
preference to a general statute limiting the time for bringing actions ex
contractu.s1 Moreover, a statute of limitation, as all statutes, must be read
in the light of reason and common sense. In its application to a given set of
circumstances, it must not be made to produce a result which the legislature,
as a reasonably minded body, could never have intended.8 2
72. Tinnen v. Mebane, 10 Tex. 246 (1853).
73. Forbes v. Cannon, 238 S.W. 1004, 1006 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1922, no
writ).
74. The Continental Supply Co. v. Hutchings, 267 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1954, writ ref'd).
75. Pillow v. McLean, 91 S.W.2d 898, 899-900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936),
aff'd, 131 Tex. 539, 117 S.W.2d 57 (1938).
76. Id. Texas & P. Ry. v. Ward County Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 257 S.W. 333, 334(Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1923), alf'd, 270 S.W. 542 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, jdgmt
adopted).
77. 21 Jac. I, c. 16 (1623).
78. Developments in the Law, supra note 70, at 1192.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa 1970); Columbus Mining Co. v.Walker, 271 S.W.2d 276, 277 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954); Chase v. Boisvert, 78 Misc. 2d 1061,
359 N.Y.S.2d 400, 404 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
81. Columbus Mining Co. v. Walker, 271 S.W.2d 276, 277 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
82. Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (1959).
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B. Privacy and the Texas Statutes of Limitations
To date there has been no litigation concerning the applicable statutes of
limitations to privacy cases in Texas. Three existing Texas statutes of
limitations conceivably apply to the privacy cause of action, according to
how the limitation statutes are construed and how the privacy actions are
analyzed and characterized.
A one-year limitation period enacted in 1897, article 5524,88 applies to
actions for malicious prosecution, for injuries done to the character or
reputation of another by libel or slander, for damages for seduction, and for
breach of promise of marriage. Although this statute does not specifically
list invasion of privacy in its enumeration of the various torts covered, it
must be realized that invasion of the right of privacy was not a cognizable
action under the common law and was not recognized in Texas as an
actionable claim until 1973.84 The type of humiliation and reputation
damages generally recognized under this limitation period seem to be
somewhat analogous to the type of damages recoverable under some forms
of the privacy action, especially "false light" and public disclosure, which
although not expressly recognized in Texas, may well be in the future.
Texas' two-year statute, article 5526,85 covers two areas of possible
application to the privacy action. Section 4 covers actions for debt where
the indebtedness is not evidenced by a contract in writing; section 6 pertains
to actions for injury done to the person of another. The relevant considera-
tions are the applicability of section 4 to appropriation actions and of section
6 to intrusion. If the false light and public disclosure actions are recognized
by Texas, section 6 might apply. In considering the proper application of
section 6, it must be determined whether the term "injury done to the person
of another" is appropriate to such intangible, hard-to-measure damages as
humiliation, embarrassment, and mental anguish unaccompanied by physical
injury.
The final limitation period, a four-year statute, article 5529,86 applies to
every action other than for the recovery of real estate, for which no
limitation is otherwise prescribed. This limitation period need be considered
only in the event that the other two articles under consideration are
inapplicable.
Before determining which limitation period or periods should apply to the
privacy action in its four distinct forms, this Comment will examine and
analyze the issue as has been determined by the various other jurisdictions in
which the question has been litigated.
C. Determinations by Other Jurisdictions of the Applicable Statutes of
Limitations in Privacy Actions
Questions concerning the proper statute of limitation to be applied in a
83. Tx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5524(1), (2) (1958).
84. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
85. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5526(4), (6) (1958).
86. Id. art. 5529.
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privacy action have arisen in jurisdictions other than Texas. The answer has
turned upon the precise wording of the statutes of limitations in the various
jurisdictions, as well as the characterization by the jurisdictions of the real
object and essence of the privacy action.
Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.17 held that a privacy action brought
in Connecticut is governed by Connecticut's general tort statute of limitation,
allowing three years to bring suit, and not by the statute allowing two years
to bring an action for libel and slander. Hazlitt concerned an action brought
against a publisher to recover damages on the dyadic grounds that a
magazine article was libelous and that it was an invasion of the right of
privacy. Holding the libel count, but not the privacy count, to be barred by
the statutes of limitations, the court said that the operative facts on which the
claimed torts of libel and privacy depend are not identical, although they
may be based upon the same publication and have much in common.18
Distinguishing the two torts, the court stated that the injury in defamation
cases is to plaintiff's reputation, which may be conceived of as having a situs
wherever the plaintiff is known. The essence of a privacy claim, however, is
mental distress caused to the plaintiff which may be considered as located at
his domicile.8 9 The court rejected defendant's claim that the Connecticut
two-year statute9° applying to defamation cases covered privacy actions as
well, stating that this statute, which specifically enumerated only the actions
of libel and slander, was too plain to leave room for the claim that it was
intended to apply to torts other than libel and slander. 91 Because only the
torts of libel and slander were specifically listed in the two-year statute, and
because the court's characterization of the privacy action was unlike its de-
scription of the defamation action, the court applied the three-year limitation
period -to the privacy action.92
A similar analysis was used in Association for the Preservation of
Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Emergency Civil Liberties Committee,3 in
which a New York court reasoned that the state's one-year statute of
limitation 94 did not mention causes of action for privacy, although it express-
ly covered libel and slander actions, and, therefore, did not apply.93 Nor
87. 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953).
88. Id. at 542.
89. Id.
90. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 1394(b) (1951), now CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-
597 (1975). This section reads: "No action for libel or slander shall be brought but
within two years from the date of the act complained of."
91. 116 F. Supp. at 542.
92. Hazlitt was cited as support in Branson v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 124 F.
Supp. 429, 431 n.2 (E.D. Ill. 1954), which held summarily that Illinois' statute of
limitation on defamation would not be applicable to a cause of action for invasion of
privacy. Although the court's construction of the statute remains as good law, the
outcome of this case would be different today, as an amendment to this statute in 1959
inserted the words, "or for publication of matter violating the right of privacy." ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 14 (1966).
93. 37 Misc. 2d 599, 236 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
94. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 51 (1920), now N.Y. Civ. P.Ac. LAw § 215 (McKinney
1972).
95. But cf. Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 266
N.Y.S.2d 406 (1965), rev'd, 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Ct.
App. 1967), a case arising from the rigged quiz shows of the late 1950's in which
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did New York's three-year statute include a violation of the common law
right of privacy existing under the laws of some other jurisdictions, although
violations of the right of privacy under the Civil Rights Law of New York9"
were within the scope of the statute. 97 As there was no express statutory
limitation in New York for actions based on violations of the common law
right of privacy, the court said that the six-year statute,98 which governed
actions not otherwise provided for, probably governed and that, at any rate,
the one-year statute was definitely inapplicable. 9
The courts in Hazlitt and Emergency Civil Liberties Committee utilized
similar reasoning in that both courts refused to apply a statute of limitation
specifically listing only actions of libel and slander to a privacy case. This
conclusion seems to be in line with the general policy of construing statutes
of limitations strictly. The New York court in Emergency Civil Liberties
Committee went even further than Hazlitt in its strict construction of the
New York limitation periods, for it recognized that there are different forms
of the privacy action, and that they are subject, under the laws of New York,
to different periods of limitations; the limitation period for New York's
statutory privacy right is not appropriate to the common law right of privacy
in other jurisdictions.
In determining the proper limitation period to be applied in a false light
privacy action, a Pennsylvania court in Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co.100
dwelt more on the characterization of the privacy action than did the
aforementioned cases. Reasoning that the gravamen of the privacy action is
the injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, including mental anguish and
distress caused by the publication, the court distinguished the privacy case
from a defamation action. The privacy action concerns injury to a person's
feelings, whereas defamation concerns injury to character or reputation,
which pertain to the standing of a person in the eyes of others and are
attributes in law separate from the "person." 101 The court held the proper
plaintiff claimed to have been victimized inasmuch as he was not supplied with the
answers before the show, although everybody thought he had the answers because the
practice was so prevalent. Plaintiff sued for damages to his reputation and academic
prospects as a result of defendant's inducing him to participate in a rigged television
contest. Although this was not the conventional action for defamation, governed by the
one-year period of § 51 of the Civil Practice Act, the court of appeals nevertheless applied
that period, reasoning that current tort doctrine defines defamation in terms of the
injury, damage to reputation, rather than in terms of the wrongful act, the written or
spoken word. The court stated that in applying a statute of limitation it looks for the
reality and the essence of the action and not its mere name. Id. at 455, 227 N.E.2d at
574, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
96. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1948). New York is one of four states
with a statutory right to privacy. Id. § 50. The other states are Oklahoma, Utah, and
Virginia. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §H 839.1-.3 (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §H
76-4-8, -9 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1957). In states with a statutory right of
privacy, the tort is delimited by the provision.
97. N.Y. Civ. PhAc. LAw § 49(8) (1920), now N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 215(3)
(McKinney 1972) (presently part of the one-year statute).
98. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 48(3) (1920), now N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 213(1)
(McKinney 1972).
99. 236 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
100. 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
101. 125 A.2d at 649.
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limitation period to be the state's two-year statute,' 0 2 which applied to suits
brought to recover "damages for injury wrongfully done to the person, in
case [sic] where the injury does not result in death . . . . 103 In reaching
its decision, the court in Hull reasoned that because recovery could be had
under a privacy action for injured feelings alone, the wrongs redressed must
be considered direct rather than indirect injury; and the injury must then be
considered as one wholly personal in character, not depending upon any
effect the publication may have on the standing of the individual in the
community.'0 4  Reasoning that an individual's mind, feelings, and mental
processes are as much a part of his person as his observable physical parts,
the court concluded that an injury affecting the sensibilities is as equally an
injury to the person as is an injury to the body.' 0 5 Therefore, the court held
that a cause of action for violation of the right of privacy, causing mental
suffering to the plaintiff, is an injury "to the person."' 0 6
Because of the court's characterization of the privacy action as one based
on emotional or mental duress, and because of the court's interpretation of
the phrase "injury to the person" as including such mental distress, l07 the
final decision reached in Hull seems logical at first glance. There was,
however, a missing element in the court's analysis: the unraised question as
to whether the characterization of the privacy tort as protection of mental
distress alone would not perhaps be different in a false light case, such as
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953).
103. Id.
104. 125 A.2d at 649. The court further distinguished between defamation and
invasion of privacy, saying that damages in actions of defamation are for an injury to
reputation while damages in actions for invasion of the right to privacy are for injury to
one's own feelings. In actions to recover damages for defamation truth is a defense,
while in actions to recover damages for invasion of privacy it is not. Id. at 650 n.5. But
see note 27 supra and accompanying text, where Prosser characterized the false light
privacy action as protecting reputation.
105. 125 A.2d at 649. The court relied upon an article by Roscoe Pound, in which
the author stated: "A man's feelings are as much a part of his personality as his limbs.
The actions that protect the latter from injury may well be made to protect the former by
the ordinary process of legal growth." Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV.
343, 363-64 (1915).
106. 125 A.2d at 649. See also Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp.
817, 825 (D.D.C. 1955); Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d
133 (1945); Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N.YS. 247 (Sup. Ct.
1911).
107. The court's interpretation of the phrase "injury to the person" is in accord with
that of the majority of states. See, e.g., Krum v. Sheppard, 255 F. Supp. 994 (W.D.
Mich. 1966); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955);
Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Commerce
Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 199 A.2d 606 (R.I. 1964); Whitley v. Whitley, 436 S.W.2d 607
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th District] 1968, no writ). In Krum v. Sheppard the
court explained:
[I]f the legislature had intended that [the statute] apply only where there
was a physical or bodily injury to the person, it would have been a simple
matter for it to express that intent clearly and unambiguously. It could
have used the words 'physical injury' or 'bodily injury' to limit the appli-
cation for this subsection. Since most legislators are skilled in the use
of language, we may presume that the failure to use such modifying
words indicates an intent to give the phrase 'injuries to person' its usual,
broader meaning.
255 F. Supp. at 999. Contra, Rheudasil v. Clower, 197 Tenn. 27, 270 S.W.2d 345, 346




Hull.'08 The court did not address that issue and did not differentiate the
different kinds of privacy actions. Whether its conclusion would have been
changed had it reached this issue is unclear.
A contrary decision to Hull was reached in a recent New Jersey case,
Canessa v. 1.l. Kislak, Inc.1 9 Canessa concerned a suite for damages
against a real estate company which distributed for its own commercial
purposes reprints of a newspaper article along with a picture of the plaintiffs.
The court held that the suit, insofar as the claim was based on appropriation
of the plaintiffs' likenesses and names for the defendant's commercial
benefit, was an action for invasion of a property right and not one for injury
to the person, and, therefore, was governed by the state's six-year statute of
limitation" relating to actions for tortious injury to property rights."' The
court said that confusion in the area of privacy has been compounded by the
fact that plaintiffs in other jurisdictions have based their actions in appropri-
ation cases solely upon "injury to feelings," without recognizing the basic
property rights involved, as they were recognized before and after the
Warren and Brandeis law review article. 112  The court explained, "the
reality of a case such as we have here is . . . simply this: plaintiffs' names
and likenesses belong to them. As such they are property. They are things
of value. Defendant has made them so, for it has taken them for its own
commercial benefit."' The court in Canessa distinguished such cases as
Hull which have held that an action for invasion of the right of privacy is
one for injury to the person. Unlike Hull, Canessa was based on the
particular theory of appropriation by the defendant for his commercial
benefit, as distinguished from the right of privacy in the general sense." 14
The court in Canessa also considered whether that aspect of the plaintiffs'
claim for mental distress was barred by the state's two-year statute governing
actions for "injury to the person."' 115 Its answer was in the negative. The
court reasoned that the New Jersey Supreme Court in Earl v. Winne" 6 held
that the words "injury to persons" in the state's two-year statute of limitation
are to be specifically construed and that such phrase comprehended only
those common law actions which were pursuable by trespass vi et armis.
Under common law the clear and basic distinction between an action of
trespass vi et armis and an action on -the case was recognized by the
difference in the periods of limitations in the original statutes in New
Jersey."17 In light of this New Jersey statutory interpretation, the court in
108. Hull is characterized as a false light action because of the facts involved. Three
police officers sued for an invasion of privacy by the defendant's republication of a
newspaper photograph of the plaintiffs grabbing at a suspect in their custody. This
photograph was used in a magazine article which did not explain or have anything to do
with the photograph, thereby placing plaintiffs in a false light. 182 Pa. Super. at 86, 125
A.2d at 644.
109. 97 N.J. Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967).
110. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:14-1 (1952).
111. 235 A.2d at 76.
112. Id. at 75-76.
113. id. at 76.
114. Id. at 74.
115. N.J. Rav. STAT. § 2A:14-2 (1952).
116. 14 N.J. 119, 101 A.2d 535 (1953).
117. 235 A.2d at 77-78.
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Canessa held that since the action for invasion of privacy involves no force
to the person, it would not have been enforceable by trespass vi et armis and
is thus not comprehended within the phrase "injury to persons." Therefore,
the court held, the privacy tort fell within the language of a "tortious injury
to the rights of another not stated in sections 2A:14-2," 118 and was not
barred until six years after the cause of action accrued.119
The analysis used in Canessa concerning interpretation of the phrase
"injury to the person" is contrary to that in Hull. The Hull court observed
that it would probably be impossible to rely upon the distinction between
trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case for a determination of the
appropriate statute of limitation because these distinctions have faded in the
law to the extent that procedural rules have completely abolished them. The
analysis in Hull seems clearly preferable to that used in Canessa. The
'distinction of the old forms of action between trespass vi et aris and
trespass on the case has no relevance in the majority of jurisdictions as to
how the phrase "injury to the person" should be construed. As the old
forms of action have been completely abandoned by modern procedural
rules, they should have no bearing on interpretation of a statute of limitation
or on the statute's applicability to a relatively new cause of action not even
recognized at common law.
Other cases have considered the statute of limitation applicable to a
privacy case. Causes of action for invasion of privacy have variously been
held to be barred by one-year, 120 two-year,' 2' three-year,122 and four-
year 123 statutes of limitations. The various decisions have turned on the
different methods of analysis discussed in the previous cases and on the
specific wording of the pertinent statutes.
118. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A: 14-1 (1952). The language of this statute specifically
includes every action "for any tortious injury to the rights of another not stated in
sections 2A: 14-2 and 2A:,14-3 of this Title ....... Id.
119. 235 A.2d at78.
120. Belli v. Roberts Bros. Furs, 240 Cal. App. 2d 284, 49 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1966).
The court here held a one-year statute of limitation to apply to a cause of action for
invasion of privacy because of an allegedly defamatory article in a newspaper. This one-
year statute reads in part as follows: "An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false
imprisonment, seduction of a person below the age of legal consent, or for injury to or
for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another .... "CAL. CIV.
PRO. CODE § 340(3) (West 1954).
121. Funk v. Cable, 251 F. Supp. 598 (M.D. Pa. 1966). The court held that under
Pennsylvania law, an action which sounds in invasion of the right to privacy and shows a
violation of rights redressable under the Federal Civil Rights Act is subject to a two-year
period of limitation. Id. at 600.
122. Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 404 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 987 (1969). In this privacy case the court held that the state statute of
limitation which best effectuates federal policy is the three-year statute. Id. at 1028.
This three-year statute governs "all other actions for injuries to persons and property."
MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(7) (1968). By its holding, therefore, the court held a
one-year limitation period pertaining to libel or slander actions to be inapplicable to a
privacy action. Id. § 600.5805(6).
123. Houston v. Florida-Georgia Television Co., 192 So. 2d 540 (Fla. App. 1966). In
this case the court held applicable a four-year statute of limitation which governs "[a]ny
action for relief not specifically provided for in this chapter." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
95.11(4) (1960). Thus, by its holding, the court held inappropriate to the privacy
action a two-year statute governing actions for libel, slander, assault, battery, and false
imprisonment. Id. § 95.11(6).
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D. Texas Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Privacy Actions
As more privacy actions are brought by injured plaintiffs encouraged by
the recent Billings and Kimbrough decisions, the problem of which limita-
tions period applies will emerge as an important issue. In determining the
statutes of limitations appropriate to privacy actions in Texas, the characteri-
zation of the action and the interpretation of the statutes under consideration
must be taken into account. As previously discussed, the forms of the
privacy action recognized in Texas, intrusion and appropriation, have been
separately characterized by the Texas courts. 12 4 The basis of the intrusion
action is the protection of personal feelings such as mental anguish, embar-
rassment, and humiliation. Appropriation, on the other hand, is viewed as
protecting pecuniary interests measured by the unjust enrichment of the
defendant in his unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name or likeness. With
the characterization of the two types of privacy actions resolved, the next
issue to consider is the interpretation of the potentially applicable statutes of
limitations.
In considering whether section 6 of article 5526,125 the two-year statute
of limitation in Texas, is applicable, the Texas interpretation of the phrase
"injury to the person" must be ascertained. Specifically, the question to be
decided is whether this term encompasses only direct bodily injury or
whether it also includes mental injury unaccompanied by physical damage.
As early as 1894 a Texas court held that a statute of limitation1 26
governing actions for injuries to the person of another includes actions
for damages for mental anguish caused by failure to deliver a telegram. 127
The Texas court of civil appeals three years later ruled again that mental
anguish, disappointment, sorrow, and affliction are in the class of "injuries to
the person" in an action for damages for negligence in the delivery of certain
telegrams. 128  It explained that such claim is within the statute "[s]o far
. . . as the petition seeks damages for injury to the mind or body . ...
Whitley v. Whitley, 1 30 a 1968 Texas court of civil appeals decision, held
that an action for alienation of affections is one for loss of consortium which
involves loss occasioning mental pain and anguish of a mental and emotional
nature and, therefore, is embraced within the term "injury done to the person
of another" under the present two-year statute, article 5526(6). 'Under
Texas interpretation of the phrase "injury to the person of another" it
appears that so far as recovery may be had for an invasion of privacy for
124. See text accompanying notes 46-57 supra.
125. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(6) (1958).
126. An Act of Limitations § 1, [1841] Tex. Laws, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs
627 (1841) (repealed 1897). This Act, now replaced, provided a one-year period for
the following classifications: "All actions for injuries done to the person of another, as of
assault, battery, wounding, or imprisonment, and all actions for injuries done the
character or reputation of another, as of libel, or slander, shall be commenced and sued
within one year next after the cause of such action or suit, and not after .... ." Id.
127. Martin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 6 Tex. Civ. App. 619, 26 S.W. 136 (1894).
128. Kelly v. Western Union Tel. Co., 17 Tex. Civ. App. 344, 43 S.W. 532 (1897).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. 436 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th District] 1968, no writ).
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injured feelings alone, then article 5526(6), a two-year statute of limitation,
would apply to such an action.' 3 '
If the Texas judiciary adheres to its precedent of construing limitation
statutes strictly, it will apply to the tort of intrusion section 6 of article 5526,
the two-year statute, which governs actions for injury to the person of
another. On the other hand, the court will apply to the appropriation action
section 4 of the same statute, article 5526, which pertains to debt where the
indebtedness is not evidenced by a contract in writing.13 2  Thus, by the
foregoing analysis, both intrusion and appropriation are governed by a two-
year time period, but by different sections of the statute. Under a strict and
literal construction of the limitation periods, neither intrusion nor appropria-
tion could come under the one-year statute; although the type of humiliation
damages in intrusion seem analogous to damages in certain actions governed
by the one-year statute, the privacy tort is simply not enumerated within the
statute and cannot be added by implication. The four-year statute is clearly
not applicable, for it is only appropriate in the event no other statute of
limitation governs.
Il1. CONCLUSION
It is submitted by this author that in light of the purposes and policy
considerations behind the limitation statutes different limitation periods
should be applied to the torts of intrusion and appropriation than would be
applied by a purely strict and literal reading of the existing statutes.
Although it may be argued that the court is free to reverse its precedent of
strict construction and to apply to the privacy tort the statute which it thinks
most appropriate in light of the purposes and policies behind the statutes of
limitations in general, it is this author's contention that this would be
undesirable and resolution of this issue calls for legislative action. An
overriding policy is the requirement of notice, and this policy is perhaps the
most important one in the area of limitation statutes because of their penal
nature. Even if the courts apply the limitation statutes as they think they
should, according to the policies behind the limitation periods and irrespec-
tive of the long-standing policy of strict construction, legislative action
should, nevertheless, implement such decision. In short, plaintiffs should not
have to guess or to be schooled in law to pick the governing time period in
131. See Kelly v. Western Union Tel. Co., 17 Tex. Civ. App. 344, 43 S.W. 532
(1897). This was an action for damages for negligence in the delivery of telegrams. The
damages alleged consisted of five dollars paid as tolls and of mental anguish, disappoint-
ment, sorrow, and affliction as the result of the company's action. Because of the bar of
the statute of limitation, the court dismissed the petition insofar as it sought to recover
damages to the person, and it regarded such damages of mental anguish as of that
category. However, it did allow the claim for the tolls paid, as this pertained to the
estate of the plaintiff. Id.
132. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(4) (1958). The limitation on an action
based on quantum meruit is barred within two years. Nystel v. Gully, 257 S.W. 286, 288
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1923, no writ). See also Russell v. Sarkeys, 286 F.2d 736, 740
(5th Cir. 1961), in which the court said that the Texas two-year statute of limitation for
actions for debt not evidenced by writing covers all types of nontort claims which give
rise to an express or implied obligation to repay and is not confined to technical actions
for debt. Further, the limitation applies to equitable as well as legal actions.
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which to bring their actions; they should not have to try to fit a newly
recognized tort unknown to Texas common law under the confines of a
statutory scheme seventy-six years old.
The public policy considerations of quick settlement of intangible, hard-to-
measure damages and disposal of spurious and frivolous claims should be
major determinants of the limitation period chosen. Because it is assumed
that injured plaintiffs will bring their actions within a reasonable time, a
short statute of limitation for -the privacy action would serve to close the
courts to many baseless and petty claims while still accommodating the more
seriously wronged litigants, thus better serving the social needs of society. In
light of the above considerations, the intrusion action, which protects such
intangible injury as mental anguish, distress, humiliation, and embarrass-
ment, should be governed by a one-year limitation period. However, the
appropriation action, essentially a quasi-contractual action, should remain
governed by the two-year statute applicable to implied-in-law contracts.
Quasi-contract and unjust enrichment are subject to different evidentiary
problems than is intrusion, and are by their nature more easily capable of
measurement in dollars and cents than are mental anguish and humiliation
damages involved in intrusion. It is submitted that the different interests
protected by intrusion and appropriation clearly call for different limitation
periods.
Should the torts of false light and public disclosure be expressly recognized
as actionable claims in Texas, as is likely because of the broad definition of
privacy given in Billings, it would be necessary to formulate a statute of
limitation for these actions, as well as -those of intrusion and appropriation. It
is submitted that should these two types of privacy eventually be recognized as
cognizable claims in Texas, a one-year period should apply to them, as well
as to intrusion. 'It is contended by this author that the torts of public
disclosure and false light are so similar to the defamation action that, if
considered afresh by the legislature, the same considerations should govern
and these three actions should all have the same statute of limitation.
It has been said that the privacy and defamation actions are separate and
distinct torts, even though they share some of the same elements and often
arise out of the same acts. 133 The legal distinction between the two is that a
defamation action is concerned with compensating the injured party for
damage to reputation, while an invasion of privacy action is concerned with
compensating the party for mental suffering.13 4  This distinction has been
blurred due to the fact that damages have not been limited to the theoretical
bases of the respective torts. 35  'For example, in Texas in defamation
actions the injured party is allowed to recover for emotional distress as well
as injury to reputation. 13  In other jurisdictions where false light and public
133. Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973).
134. Brink v. Griffith, 396 P.2d 793, 796 (Wash. 1964).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 440, 160 S.W.2d 246, 250
(1942) (if the publication is defamatory, injury to the reputation of the person defamed
is presumed, and with that injury presumed, the mental anguish of the person de-
famed may be taken into consideration in awarding damages); Enterprise Co. v. Ellis,
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disclosure actions have been recognized, damages for injury to reputation
have been awarded in addition to damages for mental injury.137 There is
no difference between the two torts as to punitive damages." s Moreover,
the constraints on recovery for defamation should not be avoided merely by
suing on another theory for the same publication of the same matter."39 In
light of the above considerations, it is concluded by this author that false
light and public disclosure actions are sufficiently similar to the defamation
action to be governed by the same statute of limitation, which would be a
one-year period. As defamation is now governed by the present one-year
limitation, article 5524,140 this statute should be enlarged by legislative
enactment to include false light and public disclosure.
98 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1936, no writ) (well-settled that
recovery may be had in libel suits for mental suffering, subjecting one to humiliation and
ridicule caused thereby); Hibdon v. Moyer, 197 S.W. 1117, 1118 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1917, no writ) (damages for mental anguish caused by publication of matter
actionable under a libel claim are recoverable regardless of whether there was any other
injury or damage); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. McDavid, 157 S.W. 224, 225
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1913, no writ); Young v. Sheppard, 40 S.W. 62 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1897, no writ).
137. See Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1112
(1962).
138. Id.
139. See Berry v. National Broadcasting Co., 480 F.2d 428, 431 (8th Cir. 1973).
140. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5524 (1958). '[Editor's Note: The Texas Su-
preme Court recently held that the one-year statute of limitation for defamation action
does not begin to run until the plaintiff actually knows of the defamatory publication.
However, the court noted that the discovery rule was inapplicable when the defamation
is made a matter of public knowledge by the media. Kelley v. Rinkle, 19 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 141 (Jan. 24, 1976).]
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